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Fiscal and Military Developments 
in Hungary during the Jagello Period 
Introduction 
There can scarcely be many occasions when a single article not only challenges 
most contemporary scholarship on a historical period but also obliges a reconsid-
eration of views and opinions held for almost half a millennium. This achieve-
ment belongs to a young Czech scholar, who in the course of his research on late-
fifteenth and early-sixteenth-century Hungary has found and published several 
neglected manuscripts relating to the size and composition of the Hungarian ar-
my at the time of Mohács. In the journal Hadtörténelmi Közlemények,1 Antonín Ka-
lous draws attention to new evidence relating to Hungarian participation in the 
battle and to the losses sustained, as well as to a description of the royal army as 
it processed ceremonially from Buda on 20 July, 1526, little more than a month 
before its fatal engagement. 
Although Kalous eschews analysis of the figures and descriptions given in the 
sources he has uncovered, the evidence he presents has the following implica-
tions. First, and as some historians have already argued, it is plain that the Hun-
garian army was of substantial size by contemporary standards, numbering, even 
though not at full strength, some 25,000 combatants by the time of the battle.2 
Secondly, it had been adjusted to fight the Turks by the inclusion in its ranks not 
only of hussars but also of a significant number of infantry. The ratio of cavalry to 
* The present essay is partly based on the author's introductory essay to The Laws of 
Hungary, 1490-1526, ed. and trans. P. Banyó, Zs. Hunyadi and M. Rady, with the assis-
tance of J. Bak, Decreta Regni Mediaevalis Hungáriáé [henceforth DRMH], Vol. 4, Buda-
pest-Idyllwild, forthcoming. An earlier version of this essay was delivered in Novem-
ber 2009 to the Late Medieval Research Seminar at Trinity College Dublin. The author 
is grateful for the insightful criticism that he received on this occasion. 
1 A. Kalous, "Elfeledett források a mohácsi csatáról: Antonio Burgio pápai nuncius jelen-
tései, és azok hadtörténeti jelentősége," [The forgotten sources on the battle of Mohács: 
The reports of papal nuncio Antonio Burgio and their importance for military history] 
Hadtörténelmi Közlemények 120:2 (2007), 603-621. 
2 B. J. Szabó, "A mohácsi csata és a 'hadügyi forradalom'," [The Battle of Mohács and the 
"Military Revolution"] Hadtörténelmi Közlemények 117 (2004), 450-55; ibid, 118 (2005), 
573-627. 
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foot soldiers is likely thus to have been around the 6:4 ratio previously estimated 
by András Kubinyi.3 The deployment of a relatively large infantry force, most of 
whom appear to have been harquebusiers and pikemen, comports with accounts 
of the battle that describe the Hungarian line as being drawn up in an integrated 
formation with blocks of infantry supporting squadrons of cavalry.4 Thirdly, the 
Hungarian army was well supplied and equipped. According to the information 
given by Kalous, its provisions were conveyed by some 5000 waggons, which 
might also be deployed on the field as a Wagenburg, a form of defense the Turks 
especially feared.5 Accompanying the army were 85 cannon and 500 smaller guns 
(barbatos pragenses). Some of the infantry are described as bearing pavises "as big 
as a man" while others were armored and carried pikes tipped with iron. In re-
viewing Kalous's findings, the military historian László Veszprémy concludes 
that the Hungarian army at Mohács had at its disposal "all the modern military 
innovations of the age."6 The Hungarian army may, as it turned out, have lost in 
battle against the Turks, but in terms of its numbers and composition it was 
plainly a formidable fighting force. 
Ever since 1526, Mohács has served as the prism through which the Jagello 
kingdom has been viewed and as a verdict on the larger failure of its rulers, 
Wladislas II (1490-1516) and his son, Louis II (1516-26). Both contemporaries and 
historians have thus been apt to contrast the supposed indignities of Jagello rule 
with the achievements of Matthias Corvinus (1458-90). In so doing, they have 
frequently drawn attention to the decline in the royal revenues after 1490 which, 
we are told, meant that the kingdom was unable to maintain the military strength 
it had previously possessed. In support of this contention, we are often assured 
- quite wrongly - that the Hungarian revenues under Matthias had equaled those 
of the kings of France.7 Once we acknowledge, however, that Hungary's military 
3 A. Kubinyi, "The Battle of Szávaszentdemeter-Nagyolaszi (1523): Ottoman Advance 
and Hungarian Defence on the Eve of Mohács," in G. Dávid, P. Fodor, eds. Ottomans, 
Hungarians and Habsburgs in Central Europe: The Military Confines in the Era of Ottoman 
Advance, London 2000, 85. 
4 "Tomoreo distese á longa fronte tutte le genti in squadra, interponendo battaglioni de 
fanti tra li squadroni de cavalli, acció non fussero si fácilmente circondati dalla molti-
tudine de turchi, et missa quella poca artiglieri c'havea in lochi opportune." P. Giovio, 
Commentarii delle cose de Turche. Venice 1541, fol. 29r. For Giovio and his knowledge of 
the 1526 campaign, see V. J. Parry, "Renaissance Historical Literature in Relation to the 
Near and Middle East (with special reference to Paolo Giovio)," in B. Lewis, P. M. Holt, 
eds. Historians of the Middle East, London 1962, 286. A translation into Hungarian is 
provided in B. J. Szabó, Mohács. Budapest 2006,158-159. 
5 C. Imbert, The Ottoman Empire: The Structure of Power. New York-Basingstoke 2002, 269. 
6 L. Veszprémy, "The state and military affairs in east-central Europe, 1380-c. 1520s," in 
F. Tallett, D. J. B Trim, eds. European Warfare, 1350-1750, Cambridge 2010,109. 
7 The myth that the Hungarian royal income in the 1480s was equivalent to the income 
of the king of France rests on Marino SanUto's Diarii, and found its way into Hungari-
an literature through Dezsó Csánki, "I. Mátyás udvara," [The Court of Matthias I] 
Századok 17 (1883), 525. The French royal income was in fact equivalent to about 4 mil-
lion florins per year in the late fifteenth century, more than five times Matthias's. 
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capability under the Jagelló rulers was actually quite considerable and the king-
dom able to field an army that counted amongst the most numerous and best 
equipped in Christendom, then we must necessarily reconsider the capacity of 
the kingdom to wage war. It is the purpose of this essay to review the resources 
available to the Jagelló kings, to reconsider the fiscal-military arrangements that 
prevailed in the kingdom after 1490, and in conclusion to offer some more gen-
eral observations on the relationship between these arrangements and the king-
dom's larger organization. In this way, we would hope to tease out the im-
portance of Kalous's discoveries for late medieval Hungary as a whole. 
Finance: Exemptions and Expedients 
Estimates of the royal income and expenditure for the Jagelló period largely de-
rive from brief statements and jottings that are, almost literally, "back of the en-
velope" calculations.8 Designed for the most part to convince the diet to agree to 
further supply or to convince foreigners that Hungary was needful of financial 
support, they should be treated with caution.9 Generally, they seem to agree that 
the royal income wavered at around 200,000 florins - split more or less evenly be-
tween ordinary revenue and extraordinary taxes - and this remains the figure 
that most historians usually quote as the royal income.10 It is indeed a very low 
sum - about £40,000 in the English money of the time, which was smaller than 
the English crown's revenue even in bad years.11 Moreover, even excluding the 
income that Matthias had derived from his foreign conquests - Silesia, Moravia 
and Lower Austria - it is considerably less than that previously obtained in Hun-
gary during the 1480s, possibly by up to two-thirds.12 
8 The majority of these calculations come from Venetian accounts. See I. Balogh, Ve-
lenczei diplomaták Magyarországról (1500-1526). [Venetian Diplomats on Hungary] Sze-
ged 1929, vii-viii, xvi, xxviii-ix, lxxvii. 
9 Zs. Hermann, "Államháztartás és a pénz értéke a Mohács előtti Magyarországon," 
[Domestic economy and the value of money in Hungary before Mohács] Századok 109 
(1975), 303, 320; A. Kubinyi, "Magyarország hatalmasai és a török veszély a lagelló-
korban," [The magnates of Hungary and the Turkish threat in the Jagelló period] in 
idem, Nándorfehérvártól Mohácsig. A Mátyás és a Jagelló-kor hadtörténete. Budapest 2007, 
239. 
1 0 Summarized in A. Kubinyi, "Hungary's Power Factions and the Turkish Threat in the 
Jagellonian Period (1490-1526)," in I. Zombori, ed. Fight Against the Turk in Central Eu-
rope in the First Half of the Sixteenth Century. Budapest 2004,121-123. 
11 G. Harriss, Shaping the Nation: England 1360-1461. Oxford 2005, 61. Conversion of cur-
rencies is facilitated by the equivalence of the Hungarian florin and the ducat which 
was recognized even at the time: see Hungarian National Archive, Collectio Antemo-
hacsiana, D1.15475. 
1 2 For the royal revenues in the 1480s, see I. Draskóczy, "King Matthias' Revenue and the 
Royal Treasury," in P. Farbaky, ed. Matthias Corvinus, the King: Tradition and Renewal in 
the Hungarian Royal Court, 1458-1490. Budapest 2008, 284; J. M. Bak, "Monarchie im 
Wellental. Materielle Grundlagen des ungarischen Königtums im fünfzehnten lahr-
hundert," in R. Schneider, ed. Das spätmittelalterliche Königtum im Europäischen Ver-
gleich. Vorträge und Forschungen 32, Sigmaringen 1987,359-360. 
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The problem that Hungary faced was commonplace throughout Europe. Since 
the thirteenth century and the birth of the noble estate in Hungary, the nobility 
had been exempt from taxation. The Hungarian nobleman's privileged status was 
deeply entrenched - so much so that when Sigismund in 1434 laid a fiftieth tax on 
all noble incomes to pay for the Hussite wars, he had to promise never to repeat 
the levy.13 Accordingly, the list of the cardinal liberties of Hungarian nobles, pro-
vided in the principal legal text of this period, Werboczy's Tripartitum of 1517, in-
cluded that "they are entirely exempt and free of all servile obligations, and of 
paying taxes and dues, tolls, customs and the thirtieth; and they need only serve 
under arms in defense of the realm."14 As Werboczy's explanation suggests, the 
nobleman's exemption from taxation arose from his personal commitment to 
serve the ruler at time of war. The law of 1498 accordingly explained in respect of 
the nobles' exemption that their ancestors had "won and defended this realm by 
the shedding of their blood and who and whose descendants still have to defend 
and protect it."15 As it happened, however, the descendants did nothing of the 
sort, for the insurrectio, the collective mobilization of the whole nobility for war, 
might only serve in extremis and on Hungarian soil.16 Accordingly, it had long 
fallen into desuetude, surviving only in rhetoric and in the general muster that 
accompanied some meetings of the diet.17 The failure of the kingdom's nobles to 
perform their traditional function as warriors and to protect ordinary folk from 
Turkish raiders was a criticism leveled at them during the peasant uprising of 
1514.18 
The nobility's exemption from taxation rested upon an outmoded formulation 
of its members' role as knights in the king's service. The impact of this exemption 
upon the medieval Hungarian kingdom was, however, substantial. Noble wealth 
accumulated over generations in the form of coin, jewelry, money lent out, herds 
and flocks, was not subject to a moveables tax. Nor was the income taxable that 
the nobleman obtained from his peasant tenants in the form of dues in kind, the 
"ninth" on produce (where it was paid), tolls, mills and payments in lieu of labor 
services. Given that there were about 300,000 peasant households in Hungary 
13 E. Mályusz, "Les débuts du vote de la taxe par les ordres dans la Hongrie féodale," 
Nouvelles Études Historiques. 2 vols, Budapest 1965,1: 60. 
14 Tripartitum, I, 9 [4] (available with parallel English-language translation as Stephen 
Werbőczy: The Customary Law of the Renowned Kingdom of Hungary in Three Parts, ed. J. 
M. Bak, P. Banyó and M. Rady, Budapest-Idyllwild 2005, published as DRMH 5. ibid., 
57). 
15 1498: 35 (references in this form refer to the laws of the realm, as given in the Corpus Ju-
ris Hungarid). 
16 1492:18,19; 1498:17. 
17 The insurrectio is mentioned in the laws of this period as if still an institution of war. 
See thus 1492:18-9; 1498:17; 1518 (Tolna): 2; 1526: 9. Although many nobles joined the 
colors in the 1526 campaign, a general levy was not summoned. 
18 J. M. Bak, "Delinquent Lords and Forsaken Serfs: Thoughts on War and Society during 
the Crisis of Feudalism," in St. B. Vardy, A. Huszar Vardy, eds. Society in Change: Stud-
ies in Honor of Béla K. Király, Boulder and New York 1983, 291-292, 294-296. 
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paying annually between two and four florins to their lords, we can estimate that 
about a million florins flowed every year into noble coffers that was not being di-
rectly taxed.19 Moreover, because the nobles were left untaxed, they had no great 
incentive to extract additional dues from their peasants. As a consequence, the 
burden falling upon the peasantry in terms of what they owed to their lords was 
relatively light - about five per cent of their average income.20 In short, because of 
the nobles' exemption from taxation, the wealth of the Hungarian countryside 
went largely untapped. 
There were some obvious ways by which to compensate for this deficiency, of 
the type to which most European rulers had resort. The alienation of lands and 
revenues was a standard recourse and one which the diet identified as a major 
cause of the hemorrhaging of the royal income.21 An easy alternative was to ex-
tract loans that were eventually paid off with such properties as might from time 
to time escheat to the crown.22 By 1516, Wladislas II had accumulated debts of 
possibly 400,000 florins in this way, and his son continued to raise loans even 
though the lenders knew that they had little chance of speedy repayment.23 Nev-
ertheless, while rulers elsewhere in Europe might acquire the bulk of their reve-
nue from taxing the cities and trade, this was not possible in Hungary. Certainly, 
Hungary had a lively commerce and wealthy merchant class, sustained primarily 
by the export of metals and cattle.24 Merchant capital was, however, difficult to 
tax, for the great venturers were often foreigners, from Nuremberg, Vienna and 
Augsburg. If pressed, they might withdraw their trade and ingenuity and bring 
commerce and mining industry to a halt. Accordingly, the loans extracted from 
them, although amounting to several hundred thousand florins over the 1520s,25 
were never as burdensome as the income tax or benevolences of Tudor England. 
For their part, native merchants often bought their way into the nobility, thus 
putting their wealth outside the reach of royal and urban taxation. 
19 The number of peasant plots derives from A. Kubinyi, " A magyar királyság népesége a 
15. század végén," [Population of the kingdom of Hungary at the end of the 15th cen-
tury] in ed. J. Kovacsics, Magyarország történeti demográfiája (896-1995). Budapest 1997, 
105. The value of peasant payments to lords is hard to quantify with any certainty as a 
significant part might be paid in kind or services, but was seldom less than a florin in 
cash per plot. See L. Kredics, L. Solymosi, A veszprémi püspökség 1524. évi urbáriuma. 
Budapest 1993. 
2 0 Á. Nógrády, "A földesúri adó és az adózás elve a keső középkori Magyarországon," 
[Seigneurial tax and the basis of taxation in late medieval Hungary] in A. Kubinyi, 
J. Laszlovszky, P. Szabó, Gazdaság és gazdálkodás a középkori Magyarországon: gazdaságtör-
ténet, anyagi kultúra, régészet. Budapest 2008, 373. 
21 1492: 27; 1514:1; 1518 (Bács): 9 ,18 ,45 ; 1521: 3. 
22 More complicatedly, escheated estates might be pledged in return for cash and then 
the pledge itself used to reimburse an existing loan, thus netting the king a double 
profit. 
23 J. Fógel, II. Lajos udvartartása 1516-1526. [The Court of Louis II] Budapest 1917,16-18. 
24 See P. Engel, The Realm of St Stephen: A History of Medieval Hungary, tr. T. Pálosfalvi, 
London-New York 2001, 323-325. 
25 Fógel, II. Lajos udvartartása, 16-17. 
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Let us take just one famous example of this. Already by the 1450s, John Er-
nuszt, a converted Jew from Vienna, was recorded as a merchant of Buda.26 He 
seems to have made his money selling goods to the court. On account of his busi-
ness skills, Ernuszt was appointed royal treasurer in 1467, elevated to the nobility 
and awarded by Matthias with the castle lordship of Csáktornya. Evidently con-
tinuing in business (it was difficult for any royal treasurer not to do so), Ernuszt 
acquired considerable mining interests in Besztercebánya. His son, Sigismund, 
was elevated to the bishopric of Pécs in 1473, which was always closely linked to 
the treasurer's office, and he succeeded to his father's office in 1493, while still 
maintaining the family's mining interests. In 1496, however, Sigismund was ac-
cused of embezzlement. In order to forestall the same sentence of imprisonment 
as had befallen his deputy, Sigismund bought his freedom for the incredible sum 
of 400,000 florins.27 Had it not been, however, for this windfall, we may guess 
that little or none of the Ernuszt family's wealth would have otherwise made its 
way to the royal treasury.28 
Beyond the nobility and the kingdom's commercial elite, there was the church. 
By the early sixteenth century, the church owned about fifteen per cent of proper-
ties in the realm and about a fifth of Hungary's market towns. The income of the 
bishops and prelates of the realm (excluding Croatia) is reckoned to have been 
about 200,000 florins per year.29 Certainly, a part of this, tithe income, might be 
effectively converted into a royal resource by specifying that it be used to furnish 
military contingents. According to the law of 1498, the principal churchmen of 
the realm were thus obliged to field retinues, amounting in all to 6,600 cavalry-
men, and the lesser clergy to contribute to furnishing the local county contin-
gents.30 The weakness of the clerical estate at the diets meant, moreover, that its 
members might be subjected to additional imposts.31 Nevertheless, the resources 
of the church remained for most of this period largely outside the treasury's 
reach. Individual churchmen, such as the cardinal primate Bakócz, might thus ac-
cumulate substantial private wealth, sufficient to found their own dynasties. In 
Bakócz's case, however, the king confiscated upon his death in 1521 his entire 
moveable wealth, which amounted to at least 40,000 florins (he was unable to get 
26 Ernuszt maintained close links with Buda's Jewish community throughout his life; his 
coat-of-arms bore a double Star of David. See G. Komoróczy, ed. Jewish Budapest, Bu-
dapest 1999,13. 
27 F. Soós, Magyarország kincstartói 1340-1540. Budapest 1999,43-44,50-51. 
28 Ernuszt had, in fact, embezzled 10,000 florins, through an easily-spotted accounting 
fraud. 
29 A. Kubinyi, Főpapok, egyházi intézmények és vallásosság a középkori Magyarországon. [Prela-
tes, ecclesiastical institutions and faith in medieval Hungary] Budapest 1999, 88. This 
figure roughly comports with our earlier estimate of total noble income being about a 
million florins per year. 
so 1498:15. 
3i 1518 (Bács): 18. See also 1495: 31. 
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hold of his landed assets).32 The royal right to sequester the entire property of 
prelates who had recently died in office was subsequently approved by the diet.33 
Thus although Bakócz's successor as primate, George Szatmári, left upon his 
death 60,000 florins of his personal fortune to the king, Louis seized the whole of 
his moveables.34 The private wealth of Bakócz and Szatmári may have been ra-
ther less than Sigismund Ernuszt's. Nevertheless, their example indicates the ex-
tent to which the treasury was failing to exploit the accrued wealth of the church, 
leaving this instead to the prelates to sweep up. 
Fiscal Decentralization 
The adage, "rich land, poor country," was never appropriate for Hungary. The 
country was rich; it was the kingdom's government that was poor. Under the Ja-
gelló rulers, however, a system of decentralized revenue collection was put in 
place that broke with the methods previously used by Matthias, whereby taxes 
were paid directly into the treasury and expended on the recruitment of a largely 
mercenary (and foreign) royal army. It is not clear how the fiscal arrangements 
practiced after 1490 worked in all their details. The texts of the laws relating to 
royal finance are often ambiguous and they do not always comport with the sur-
viving charter material. Some guidance is, however, provided by the survival of a 
volume of treasury records for 1494-1495, compiled as part of the evidence laid 
against Sigismund Ernuszt.35 This tells us that treasury expenditure was 200,000 
florins, but that actual income was 180,000 florins, leaving a 20,000 florin deficit. 
Income should, however, have been about a 100,000 florins more, but there was 
significant non-payment to the treasury of a part of the one-florin household tax 
raised on the peasantry.36 
If we examine these figures closely, however, several discrepancies become 
apparent. Most obviously, no tax income is recorded from twelve of the counties 
in the south-east of the kingdom. Instead, a single payment was made on their 
behalf of a token 5000 florins by the military captain, Paul Kinizsi, who bore re-
sponsibility at that time for the defense of the Lower Danube frontier.37 Plainly, 
Kinizsi had himself collected the tax of the twelve counties, allocated it according 
to his own military needs, and handed over what remained to the treasury. 
Likewise, there are in the treasury accounts no references to income accruing 
from Slavonia - presumably, these too were retained at source. The figures given 
elsewhere in the treasury accounts in respect of non-payment of the household 
3 2 V. Fraknói, Erdődi Bakócz Tamás élete. [Life of Thomas Bakócz of Erdőd} Budapest 1889, 
176, 200; Hungárián National Archive, Collectio Antemohacsiana, D1.8805. 
3 3 1525 (Hatvan): 17. 
3 4 P. Tóth-Szabó, Szatmári György prímás (1427-1524). [Life of Primate György of Szatmár] 
Budapest 1906,301-302. 
35 Registrum omnium proventuum regalium, published in J. Ch. von Engel, Geschichte des 
ungrischen Reichs und seiner Nebenländer, Vol. 1, Halle 1797,17-181. 
36 Ibid., 181-182. 
37 Ibid., 17. 
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tax are equally suggestive. Certainly, there were in every county petty nobles 
who because they owned no land of their own had become liable to taxation but 
who were, nonetheless, incapable of payment. The vast majority of the unpaid tax 
had, however, been assessed by officials on behalf of the treasury by reference to 
peasant households, but the relevant lords had not released the money. These 
lords included the principal barons of the realm, most notably the palatine, so we 
are hardly dealing here with the sequestration of royal revenues by unscrupulous 
robber lords living on the political or geographical margins of the kingdom. 
The income which local lords were diverting in 1494-1495 was the so-called 
subsidium of a florin. This was an extraordinary tax, normally voted by the diet 
(although in some years the diet was bypassed and the tax approved by the royal 
council alone), that was raised on peasant households. From no later than 1493, 
however, the leading men of the realm were permitted to collect this tax them-
selves and use it to recruit troops for their own retinues, and this arrangement 
prevailed for most of the Jagello period.38 These private armies or banderia were 
supposed to operate at a fixed size, but the figure was adjusted to the resources 
available.39 Barons fielding armies on the frontier and those required to maintain 
standing forces had their income supplemented with direct grants from the royal 
treasury.40 Likewise, the major prelates were expected to retain banderia, fur-
nished out of the revenue of their tithe income, and to deploy these on the bor-
der.41 
Ordinary nobles who did not have their own banderia or standing forces were 
expected to enforce collection of the subsidium from their tenant peasants. A part 
of the money they raised was paid to the treasury, which used the proceeds to 
sustain the border defenses and to subsidize the main baronial banderia.*1 The re-
mainder, about a half of the total that was collected, was not, however, paid to 
the treasury but to the county. These pecuniae exercituales (pecuniae ad exerci-
tuandum), as they were known, were used to recruit mercenaries, mainly heavy 
cavalrymen, although lightly-armed hussars were increasingly demanded, espe-
cially in the south, as they were better at dealing with Turkish raiders, while in 
the northern counties harquebusiers were required 43 As far as we can make out, 
these mercenaries were local men, possibly landless peasants or drovers who fol-
lowed a military vocation for part of the year. The names of the mercenaries' cap-
tains, where they are preserved, certainly suggest a Hungarian origin.44 
38 J. Házi, Sopron szabad királyi város története. Oklevéltár. [History of the Royal Free City of 
Sopron. Documents] 2 vols. Sopron 1921-1933, Vol. 1, part 6:123; 1518 (Tolna): 17. 
39 Házi, Sopron, ibid., 122; 1492: 20; 1518 (Bács): 1. 
« These are listed in 1498: 21. 
« 1498:15; 1521:15. 
42 Kubinyi, "The Battle of Szávaszentdemeter-Nagyolaszi (1523)," 76; ed. E. Liptai, Ma-
gyarország hadtörténete. [Military history of Hungary] 2 vols, Budapest 1984,1,141. 
43 1498:16; 1523:19. 
44 K. Kandra, "Bakócz-codex," in idem, Adatok az egri egyházmegye történelméhez. Vol. 1, 
Eger 1885, 350-351, 402-403; A. Kubinyi, "The Road to Defeat: Hungarian Politics and 
Defense in the Jagiellonian Period," in J. M. Bak, B. K. Király, From Hunyadi to Rákóczi: 
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The number of troops that any individual county was supposed to furnish 
rested on a ratio determined by the number of peasantry. The ratio varied from 
one warrior per 36 households, to one per twenty and even one per ten.45 When 
the number of troops needed or their period of service increased, the subsidium 
also went up, after 1518 from one to two florins per peasant household. The prin-
ciple of the ratio went back to militia portalis introduced during the reign of Si-
gismund by the terms of which the peasants themselves had been obliged to fur-
nish set numbers of warriors from out of their ranks. Although this form of mili-
tary recruitment had long been abandoned, the pecuniae exercituales were under-
stood as payments made in lieu of military service.46 In time of emergency, how-
ever, some or all peasants might yet be expected to join local units 47 
The fiscal methods of the Jagello rulers involved the decentralization to the 
barons and the counties of revenue collection and its disbursement locally on mil-
itary recruitment. This sort of arrangement required, however, a high degree of 
trust, which was in short supply in Jagello Hungary. The common nobles who 
gathered at the diet or sent delegates there, were convinced that the lords and 
larger landowners were not in fact collecting taxes from their peasants to field 
armies but were purloining the money instead for their own ends. This was true 
to the extent that the lords collected the subsidium every year from their tenants 
but were seldom obliged to raise their banderia for service in war, deploying such 
troops as they raised for private purposes. Accordingly, in 1511 the diet succeed-
ed in securing the appointment of an "estates treasurer," elected by itself, who in 
company with one of the barons, was supposed to supervise the collection and 
administration of the tax voted that year.48 The institution soon languished and 
after 1516 the royal council assumed control of the treasury apparatus.49 Clearly 
though, the common nobility remained convinced that money was being divert-
ed to personal ends. At the Tolna diet of 1518, the diet sought to have representa-
tives of the counties supervise the collection of taxes, after which they were held 
to report to the diet.50 Later that year, an even more ambitious scheme was pro-
War and Society in Late Medieval and Early Modem Hungary, New York 1982,168. See al-
so 1521:16. 
45 1492: 20; 1498:16; 1518 (Tolna): 2; 1523:19. 
4 6 C. Wagner, Petri de Warda Epistolae, Pressburg-Kassa 1776, 218. Here praediales of the 
Archbishop of Kalocsa who should have served with the contingent of Solt county 
were held liable to pecuniae exercituales, but they claimed poverty (1491); A. Kubinyi, 
Matthias Rex. Budapest 2008,118. See also 1526: 28. 
47 E. Mályusz, "II. Lajos király levelei a Herceg Batthyány-család körmendi levéltárában 
(1526)," [Letters of King Louis II in the Prince Batthyány Family Archive in Körmend] 
Levéltári Közlemények 4 (1927), 81, 87, 89-90; A. Fekete Nagy, et al., Monumenta Rustico-
rum in Hungaria Rebellium Anno MDXIV, Budapest 1979,105; 1523:19; 1526:10. 
48 Gy. Bónis, "Ständisches Finanzwesen in Ungarn im frühen 16. Jahrhundert," in Nou-
velles Études historiques. 2 vols, Budapest 1965,1: 87-89. 
4 9 D. Szabó, A magyar országgyűlések története II. Lajos korában. [History of the Hungarian 
diets in the reign of Louis II] Budapest 1909,22. 
so 1518 (Tolna): 9-12. 
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posed whereby the diet would, as in 1511, appoint its own estates treasurers who 
would arrange for the collection of taxes, see to the recruitment of mercenary 
forces, and ensure that the barons fielded banderia appropriate to the revenues 
that they raised. The system of supervision inaugurated at the Bacs diet of 1518 
scarcely lasted much more than a year.51 Nevertheless, in 1521 an even more radi-
cal remedy was attempted by the diet. All payments of tax were henceforth to go 
through estates treasurers appointed by the diet and the previous arrangement 
whereby barons and larger landowners funded their contingents by diverting 
revenues was abolished. From now on, their banderia and retinues were to be paid 
for out of central funds. The aim behind this was both to prevent defalcation and 
to equip a larger mercenary force.52 As it turned out, however, the scheme im-
posed in 1521 was far too ambitious as well as too cumbersome and inflexible. 
Money continued to be diverted at source in order to fund military recruitment 
and thus never made its way to the treasury.53 On the ground, many of the collec-
tors were inexperienced and selected on account of their connections rather than 
their expertise. In the end, less than a paltry 100,000 florins reached the treasury. 
The arrangement was abandoned and previous methods of military financing re-
introduced, with the barons, larger landowners and counties once again equip-
ping their forces out of tax revenue taken at source.54 
The financial reform of 1521 was accompanied by two further innovations. 
First, the treasury undertook a reform of the coinage, replacing its silver denar 
currency with heavily debased coin, an expedient from which, it was anticipated, 
"a great sum of money could be added to [the king's] revenues."55 As it turned 
out, the reform resulted in immediate inflation and yielded only a one-off divi-
dend of about 120,000 florins.56 Secondly, the principle of the nobility's exemp-
tion from taxation was for the first time called into question. In a remarkable act, 
the diet meeting in 1521 imposed a fifty per cent levy on the major sources of no-
ble income, "notwithstanding the privilege of their liberty."57 It is uncertain 
whether this extreme measure was applied in the years immediately following 
and Louis promised that it would not be.58 In 1525, however, a record of all noble 
incomes, including revenue streams that had been left out of the law of 1521, was 
required by the diet with a view to establishing the military obligations of the in-
dividual counties of the realm.59 A few months later, local captains were given 
the right to assess noble incomes on the spot and take what they needed to fit out 
troops.60 Although this last measure was set aside as the diet that had agreed it 
51 Bónis, "Ständisches Finanzwesen," 92. 
5 2 Kubinyi, "The Battie of Szávaszentdemeter-Nagyolaszi," 81-82. 
5 3 Szabó, A magyar országgyűlések története, 177 
5 4 Bónis, "Ständisches Finanzwesen," 94-100. 
55 1521: 6, 14; 1526: 36. 
56 A. Kubinyi, "Magyarország hatalmasai és a török veszély," 239. 
57 1521:17. 
58 1521: 21. 
59 1525 (Rákos): 9. 
60 1525 (Hatvan): 10. 
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was deemed illegal, the assembly that convened the next year approved the prin-
ciple of taxes being raised according to the capacity of individual nobles.61 It may 
well be that the taxes on noble income and wealth were never actually imposed 
or, if they were, never collected in full (the English lay subsidies seldom yielded 
more than a small fraction of what they should have done).62 Nevertheless, the 
implication in the laws was clear: henceforth nobles should regard their revenues 
as being, at least in extremis, a taxable resource. 
The arrangements briefly adopted in 1521 - removal of the nobility's exemp-
tion, debasement of the coinage and the attempt to have all taxes go through the 
treasury - should not distract us from the principle of fiscal decentralization that 
prevailed throughout most of the Jagello period. According to this principle, a 
part of the kingdom's military capacity was funded at a local level, with royal 
revenues being taken at source to equip the banderia of the barons and to provide 
for the upkeep of the local contingents maintained by the counties. What passed 
to the king was used to fund the border garrisons and the few banderia that were 
sustained directly by the royal treasury. These forces were supplemented with 
retinues provided by the church out of its tithe income. It is for this reason that 
the treasury receipts look so low, since much of what was actually feeding into 
the kingdom's military capacity never actually went through the treasury. Its in-
come of 200,000 florins listed in the 1494-1495 treasury records thus represents 
only a portion of the wealth that the treasury mobilized. If we consider the mon-
ey taken at source by the barons, larger landowners and counties, and add in the 
tithe income used to furnish the prelates' own retinues along with the money ac-
cruing through ordinary revenues (salt, customs and so on), then we may reckon 
on an imputed income in the early sixteenth century of around 600,000 florins per 
year, plus windfalls, forced loans and so on. Although this sum was still small in 
comparison to the sums raised in contemporary France or Spain, it was about the 
same amount as Matthias obtained from domestic sources during the last dec-
ades of his reign. 
Away from the Fiscal-Military State 
Despite the misgivings of the diet, the decentralized fiscal arrangements prac-
ticed under Hungary's Jagello rulers proved sufficient to field an army of impres-
sive size and composition. As it happened, the army deployed at Mohacs was no 
match for the Sultan who, being aware of the kingdom's military strength, had 
taken care to raise against it a double army that was made up of both his Anatoli-
an and Rumelian (that is Balkan) forces. The fiscal-military organization of the 
realm not only, however, resulted in the provision of an army capable of taking 
on the Turks, albeit unsuccessfully, but also hastened political decentralization 
within the kingdom, thereby reinforcing existing relations of power. 
1526:11. 
62 M. lurkowski, C. L. Smith, D. Crook, Lay Taxes in England and Wales 1188-1688. Kew 
1988,130-133. 
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The relationship between war and the development of polities has by now be-
come generally accepted. We are told that from the late Middle Ages onwards 
(the date is unclear), the burden of military provision obliged governments to 
shift from domain-based to tax-based systems of revenue raising. Along with 
this, came the bureaucratic and professional organization of government, in-
creased governmental reach over available resources, larger administrative and 
financial centralization, and by degrees a greater apprehension among those 
called upon to shoulder the burden of taxation that they belonged to a political, 
even national community. By this measure, the fiscal imperatives engendered by 
warfare led to the foundation of the modern state. In reviewing these develop-
ments in the later Middle Ages, Jean-Philippe Genet has remarked, "The costs of 
war were enormous and rising [...]. Spurred on by the vital necessity to generate 
an ever-increasing amount of capital, [...] the growing "modern states" of west-
ern Europe had developed a means of raising money which guaranteed more 
abundant revenues than before [...]. As the revenues of these societies increased, 
so they functioned more effectively as states."63 
There are plenty of criticisms of the fiscal-military model of state develop-
ment, not least its teleology, the many exceptions to its rules (most signally the 
case of Prussia, the revenues of which long remained significantly domain-
based), and its emphasis upon the coercive nature of government. As Charles Til-
ly reminds us, besides forcing the costs of war from their subjects, rulers might 
also pursue other routes, negotiating with existing power-holders and having 
them use their local muscle to extract the cash that the rulers themselves needed. 
In return, rulers might be induced to concede new rights to these power-holders, 
thus reinforcing their privileges and power. As Tilly observes, "[ . . . ] bargaining 
over the state's extractive claims produced rights, privileges and protective insti-
tutions that had not previously existed."64 As a consequence, the fiscal demands 
of government brought about by war might not have the transforming, modern-
izing influence that may be observed in some parts of Western Europe, but serve 
instead through bargaining to entrench existing relations of power, even at the 
expense of the centre's own authority. At its most extreme, this phenomenon may 
be discerned in parts of the Ottoman Empire after around 1600, when substantial 
tax-raising and military responsibilities were vested by the Sultan in local pashas 
and potentates, who thereafter exercised an almost independent power in their 
provinces. Such also occurred, however, in late-seventeenth and eighteenth-
century England, which is often otherwise regarded as one of Europe's premier 
fiscal-military states. As O'Brien and Hunt have argued in relation to England af-
ter 1688, "The level, structure and mode of government deployed for direct taxa-
63 J.-Ph. Genet, "Politics: Theory and Practice," in Ch. Allmand, The New Cambridge Medi-
eval History, Vol. 7, (c. 1415-c. 1500), Cambridge 1998, 6-7. 
w Ch. Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-2990. Oxford 1990, 103. Tilly's 
analysis is obviously indebted to Barrington Moore's Social Origins of Dictatorship and 
Democracy. Boston 1966. 
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tion reflected compromises between court and country, centre and locality, mon-
archy and aristocracy over the division of political power within the realm."65 
The same set of considerations surely also apply to the last decades of medie-
val Hungary.66 The decentralized system of tax collection and military recruit-
ment employed by the Jagello kings had the consequence of entrenching the 
powers of the principal power holders and institutions in the realm, thereby di-
minishing the scope and persuasiveness of royal government. The counties thus 
had their autonomy and authority extended, and they accordingly became semi-
autonomous corporations, vested not only with the authority to collect taxes and 
raise contingents for war but also with an extended jurisdictional competence 
that included the right to choose their own magistracies. It was, however, the 
great lords - those who collected the tax revenues due from their estates and 
converted this resource into their own private armies or banderia - that profited 
the most. After 1498, the leading men of the kingdom, the so-called "banderial 
lords," were recognized as constituting a hereditary class of barons. Whereas 
previously the dignity of baron and thus automatic membership of the royal 
council had belonged to the king's main office holders and so depended upon the 
royal right of nomination, from this point on a hereditary peerage was also 
acknowledged with rights identical to those of the kingdom's "true barons." The-
se barones naturales or barons ex natu were chosen from among those families who 
by reason of their wealth had the physical resources to equip and field their own 
military contingents and have them muster under their own banner. Like the of-
fice-holding barons, the hereditary peers had the address of magnificus, received a 
personal royal summons to attend meetings of the diet and were entitled to seal 
documents with red wax. The establishment of a hereditary baronage, with full 
entitlement to sit on the royal council, presaged the emergence just a century later 
of the Upper House of the Hungarian diet. Together with the county gentry, it 
was this group of hereditary barons which would later prove the main obstacle to 
Habsburg bureaucratic centralization. 
Conclusion 
As Antonin Kalous's work has demonstrated, the Hungarian army that fought 
the Turks in 1526 was both numerous and well equipped. It was sustained 
through a system of military recruitment and finance that rested not upon the 
centralization of functions, as was typical of fiscal-military states, but upon its 
very reverse. Fiscal decentralization was effective and probably resulted in an 
imputed, indirect yield to the treasury that was little different to that previously 
obtained in the fifteenth century, during the reign of Matthias. This decentraliza-
tion, however, resulted in a consolidation of the powers of both the counties and 
the emerging class of hereditary peers. In this way, fiscal developments during 
6 5 P. O'Brien and Ph. A. Hunt, "England, 1685-1815," in R. Bonney, The Rise of the Fiscal 
State in Europe, c. 1200-1815. Oxford 1999, 78. 
6 6 For this and what follows, see M. Rady, Nobility, Land and Service in Medieval Hungary. 
Basingstoke and New York 2000,153-154,170. 
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the Jagello period, although yielding an efficient army, served to entrench Hun-
gary's existing structure of power relations, thus contributing to the kingdom's 
political complexity and to the weakness of its central authority. 
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